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Zunker: Civil Rights - Limitations of the Immunity Defense for Public Off

CIVIL RIGHTS-Limitations of the Immunity Defense for Public Officials in
Damage Actions Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971). Smith v.
Losee, _.__ F.2d .
No. 72-1244 (10th Cir., Aug. 22, 1973).

In February 1969, Plaintiff Smith was dismissed from
his teaching position at Dixie Junior College, St. George,
Utah. Smith had been politically active and had been critical
of administrative acts at Dixie. As a result of his dismissal,
Smith brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971) against the
Defendants Losee, President of Dixie College, and Barnum
and Peterson, Deans at Dixie College. The United States
District Court of Utah, Central Division, found the defendants liable for money damages on the grounds that they had
acted to deprive Smith of his civil rights. From this judgment the defendants appealed. They contended, inter alia,
that they were immune from judgment by virtue of their
offices. The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit,
held that the immunity privilege which they claimed was a
qualified and not an absolute one. Absent a valid defense,
they would be liable. The court then reversed the judgment
against the Board of Education because it had established a
qualified privilege. The court held that the board had affirmatively shown that their decision to discharge Smith represented an exercise of discretion vested in them by state law,
made in good faith, and without malice, when the official
facts before them showed a good and valid reason for the
decision, even though other reasons advanced may have been
constitutionally impermissible. However, the court held that
Defendant Peterson had not established a qualified privilege
because he had acted for the purpose of punishing Smith for
his political activities and for other reasons relating to First
Amendment rights. Consequently, he was liable for special
damages. Finally, the court held that since the evidence
showed that the Defendants Losee and Barnum had acted
with malice in effecting Smith's dismissal, they were liable
for both special and punitive damages without reference to a
qualified immunity defense.'
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971),
which provides as follows:
1. Smith v. Losee-F.2d -----, No. 72-1244 (10th Cir., Aug. 22, 1973)
(Hereinafter cited as Smith).
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Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
One of the problems which the courts have had with this
section has been that of reconciling its provisions with the
doctrine of governmental immunity and qualified privilege
as they have traditionally been applied to officials sued under
the section's provisions.
Government immunity as an absolute defense is limited.
It has been recognized for federal legislators' under the provisions of the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution
It has also been extended by judicial decision to state legislators,' judges,6 certain executives of high rank,7 and municipalities,' at least when money damages are involved.
Aside from these limited applications, the doctrine of
immunity has been considered a qualified privilege. The problem has been to determine at what point the qualified privilege should be applied. The Supreme Court has said that the
privilege has not been abolished by section 1983 ;"o however,
before it is invoked, a careful inquiry into the facts of the particular case is to be made. 1 This inquiry must include a
2. Commentators have traced much of this confusion to the holding in Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). For a discussion of the causes, see Thornberry,
Suing Public Entities Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Monroe v.
Pape Reconsidered, 43 U. COL. L. REV. 105 (1971); Kates and Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S.
CAL. L. Rv. 131 (1972).
3. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387
U.S. 82 (1967).
4. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6.
5. Tenney v..Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
6. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
7. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
8. Monroe v. Pape, supra note 2.
9. Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970).
The court said the holding in Monroe, supra note 2, at 323, was not applicable to equitable actions against municipalities. This view has been criticized as a misreading of note 50 in Monroe, supra note 2, at 191. See Thornberry, supra note 2.
10. Pierson v. Ray, supra note 6.
11. Doe v. McMillan, ..... U.S.
,93 S. Ct. 2018 (1973).
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careful balancing of the rights of the plaintiff to recover
under section 1983, and the public interest in protecting its
officials from suit by invoking the immunity privilege.
Because the Court has not set out specific conditions under which the defense is to operate, the circuit courts have
attempted to decide the issue for themselves. The Second
Circuit has apparently taken the position that once the plaintiff has established that an official, acting under color of state
law, has violated his civil rights, the official is no longer entitled to the privilege defense.' " The District of Columbia has
used the traditional "discretionary v. ministerial" test to
determine whether or not it Will grant the privilege.1 3 However, the most common test seems to be the "good faith" test.
This test is applied in the Fifth,"4 Sixth,'1 5 and Seventh" Circuits. It requires that after the plaintiff has shown that the
defendant has violated the provisions of section 1983, the defendant must go forward with evidence which shows he has
acted in good faith and without malice. When an issue of
racial discrimination has been raised, a district court in the
Fifth Circuit,1" and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals"
have required this good faith be established by "clear and
convincing" evidence.
Because Smith involved an action for money damages
against public officials in their individual capacities, the
Tenth Circuit was presented with an opportunity to reassess
its position on the immunity question. In reassessing its position, the court has turned away from its reliance on state
rules governing immnunity"9 and has opted for the creation of
a "federal" immunity rule.2" In taking this position, the
Tenth Circuit said that federal actions could not be limited by
state laws or rules relating to sovereign immunity or official
12. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
13. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The court held that all
discretionary acts by government officials were protected by the doctrine
of immunity, while ministerial acts which violated provisions of section
1983 were not protected by the doctrine.
14. Fluker v. Ala. Bd. of Educ., 441 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1971).
15. Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1958).
16. McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
17. Williams v. Kimbrough, 295 F. Supp. 578, 585 (W.D. La. 1969).
19. Franklin v. Meredith, 386 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1967) ; Jones v. Hopper, 410
F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969); Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir.
1971).
20. Smith v. Losee, supra note 1, at 19.
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privilege." In so doing, the court has adopted the position
advocated by Justice Douglas in Monroe v. Pape" and by commentators who contend that without such a federal rule,
state immunity doctrines will operate to emasculate section
1983.28
Furthermore, the court adopted the view that in all federal actions brought under section 1983, public officials, such
as boards of education and administrators, would be entitled
only to a qualified privilege. Taking its cue from the United
States Supreme Court in Doe v. McMilla*, the Tenth Circuit
said that the extent to which the defense would operate would
be determined, in part, by the duties of the official.24 In other
words, the greater the official's responsibilities and duties,
and the wider his scope of discretion, the greater his privilege.2"
Noting that a board of education and similar boards are
frequently comprised of citizens who volunteer their time
and who are often required to act in quasi-legislative role, the
Tenth Circuit said that the privilege available to them would
lie somewhere between the absolute privilege of legislators
and the "in good faith and without malice" privilege of
police officers.26 The court placed boards of education and
administrators between these two positions, not because these
were the two extreme positions, but because the Supreme
Court had identified these two levels of immunity in its decisions. 7 On this basis, the court held that the Utah State
Board of Education was entitled to the immunity defense
and -reversed the judgment against them. However, the Tenth
Circuit said the three administrators were entitled to a lesser
privilege than that available to the Board.2"
Exactly what that privilege was never clearly emerged
because the defendants Losee and Barnum were found to have
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Supra note 2, at 183.
Kates and Kouba, supra note 2, at 145.
Supra note 11.
Barr v. Matteo, supra note 7.
Smith v. Losee, supra note 1, at 26.
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, supra note 3 (fed'l legislators); Tenney v. Brandhove, supra note 5 (state legislators); Pierson v. Ray, supra note 6 (police
officers).
28. Smith v. Losee, supra note 1, at 27.
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acted with malice in seeking Smith's dismissal." Because
malice was present, the court said it was unnecessary to consider a qualified privilege for them. The defendants, the court
held, would have been liable under any test, save that of absolute privilege.
Unlike the defendants Losee and Barnum, Peterson was
not found to have acted with malice. Potentially, he was entitled to a qualified privilege. However, the privilege was
denied, and the evidence which would have been necessary to
invoke the privilege was not explained. The court simply held
that, since his actions were taken to punish Smith for his political activities,3 0 Peterson was liable for special, though not
punitive, damages.
The primary significance of Smith is the court's attempt
to create a "federal" rule on immunity. Prior to this decision,
the Tenth Circuit had applied an extremely rigid and subjective test to suits brought under section 1983."' In fact, unless
the plaintiff could show that an official had acted fraudulently or had committed some other equivalent wrongdoing,
32
he could not even state a federal cause of action.
The reason for this was that the court had relied heavily
in the past upon the theory that public officials sued under
section 1983 were "alter egos" of the state. As such, they
were cloaked in the immunity of the state, making them virtually immune from judgment."3 However, by moving away
from this position, the court has given meaning to a concept
which was latent in earlier decisions,34 namely, officials acting
29. Id. Although never giving explicit examples of malice, the court noted that
the plaintiff had been "harassed" by Losee and Barnum, and that the trial
court had found malice in their actions. The malice apparently derived from
the reasons which the defendants advanced for Smith's dismissal, that is,
his political activity, his opposition to the administration while serving on
the executive committee of the Faculty Association, and his criticisms of
the administration.
30. As faculty sponsor of the Young Democrats, Smith had been active in a
successful campaign to defeat an incumbent state senator.
31. Note, The Defense of "Good Faith" Under Section 1983: London v. Florida
Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 813 F. Supp. 591 (N.D. Fla.
1970), 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 666 (1971).
32. Jones v. Hopper, supra note 19, which holding the court specifically modifies in Smith.
33. Id.; Williams v. Eaton, supra note 19.
84. Williams v. Eaton, supra note 19; Harris v. Tooele County School Dist.,
471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1974

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 9 [1974], Iss. 1, Art. 14

268

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. IX

under color of law in an unlawful manner may be held personally liable. 5
While these changes reflect the Tenth Circuit's attempt
to keep pace with the positions being taken by the Supreme
Court, several of the circuit courts, and with the changing
conditions in a complex society, the court has left several
matters unresolved by its decision.
First, it is not altogether clear what kind of evidence the
plaintiff must establish to shift the burden of proof to the
defense. It appears from the decision that the burden shifts
after the plaintiff has established two things: (1) that the
official has acted under color of state law, and (2) that the
official's acts have deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. 6 However, other language suggests that the plantiff must also show
that such acts were taken absent good faith or without malice." It appears Smith established not only that he had a cause
of action under section 1983, but that the acts of the defendants were unjustifiable.
The court has said that proof is required to support the
defense of qualified privilege 8 and that such proof is often
a showing of the absence of malice, or the presence of good
faith, or some other showing of good and proper cause." It
would be the better approach, however, for the court to require
that the plaintiff need only show that he has a cause of action
under section 1983 before the burden of proof would shift to
the defendant, who must then go forward with evidence to
show that he has acted in such a manner as to justify the
extension of the privilege.
This approach is preferable for two reasons. First, it
requires the plaintiff to do no more than the statute requires.
Secondly, since the qualified privilege may operate to deprive
a plaintiff, whose civil rights have been violated, of a money
judgment, the defendant should have the primary burden of
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

The court relied upon the reasoning in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Smith v. Losee, supra note 1, at 9.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 21.
Id.
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showing he has acted in good faith, without malice, or for
some other good or probable cause.
Secondly, the court has left unanswered the extent to
which the qualified privilege will be granted to public officials such as boards of education and administrators. To
say that the privilege lies somewhere between the absolute
privilege of legislators and the "in good faith and without
malice" privilege of police officers is of little help. On the
one hand, the decision seems to imply that the privilege available to boards which are not unlike legislative bodies lies very
near the absolute privilege of those bodies. On the other hand,
the decision also seems to imply that the privilege available
officials such as administrators is very much like that which
is available to police officers.
For example, the court has said that several factors are to
be considered in determining the privilege available to boards.
First, the court must determine the scope of the board's authority by looking to state statutes." Secondly, it must determine if the act in question was within the board's discretionary powers under the statute. Thirdly, the court must determine if the actions were taken in good faith and without malice. Finally, it must determine whether the facts before the
board showed a "good and valid" reason for the decision, even
though other, constitutionally impermissible reasons were
present and advanced.4
Unfortunately, the only thing certain in all of this is that
a board such as the Utah State Board of Education will have
virtually absolute immunity, absent a showing of malice.
Otherwise, the new test leaves unanswered several important
questions. For example, the court has not said whether this
broad privilege will apply to local school boards, or if it will
be limited only to boards whose duty it is to oversee statewide
activities. Additionally, the court does not indicate whether
the absence of any of these other factors, such as the absence
of discretionary authority, or of good faith, or of other good or
probable cause, will be sufficient by themselves to preclude
40. Id. at 25.
41. Id. at 26.
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the privilege, or if they will have to exist in some sort of
combination before the privilege will be barred.
Neither has the court indicated whether a college president or a school superintendent will have a greater privilege
than a lesser administrator, such as a dean or a principal.
In fact, it may well be that the test will be different not only
for executive officers and supervisory personnel but for
executive officers of different authority as well. At best, the
only inference that can be drawn is that the test which is appiled to lesser administrators will be the "in good faith and
without malice" test.2
A third problem which has arisen as a result of the Tenth
Circuit's attempt to create a "federal" immunity law is that
of the "in good faith and without malice" portion of the test.
Apparently, the court considers absence of good faith and
presence of malice to be two separate tests, for it found that
the defendant Peterson was liable, not because he had acted
with malice, but because he had acted to punish Smith for his
political activities and for other reasons which violated
Smith's First Amendment rights. The latter is an example
of the absence of good faith, but it apparently is not an
example of a malicious act.
This is confusing because the courts which have used this
test have tended to use the terms interchangeably. It is also
confusing because it is difficult to conceive how an official
could act without good faith and still not be acting without
malice. The court will have to make clear what constitutes
good faith and what constitutes malice, for the chief case
upon which it relies is not factually similar, and provides no
help in defining the terms or their differences."
Clearly, the best approach would be to consider an absence of good faith and malice to be the same. Furthermore,
42. Id. at 27-28.
43. Pierson v. Ray, supra note 6. The defendant police officers had arrested
the plaintiffs, who, in an effort to promote racial equality, had refused to
leave a segregated waiting room in a bus depot. While the ordinance the
officers sought to enforce was unconstitutional, the Court said the officers
were not required to determine in advance if the ordinance they sought to
enforce was constitutional. If they could show that they had acted with
good faith and probable cause, they would be entitled to a qualified privilege
defense.
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what constitutes good faith should be determined, not by
applying the strictly subjective test of what the official actually intended, but by applying an objective test which evaluates the official's actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances. 4 This approach will mean that good faith will not
be limited to preconceived notions, but will vary according to
the facts presented by the individual case.
One last ambiguity in the court's decision remains to be
discussed. This is the level of proof which the court will require of the defendant before the privilege will be granted.
While the usual level of proof required in civil actions is proof
by a preponderance, the court favorably cited Williams v.
Kimbrough," which required that the defendant show by
"clear and convincing" proof that he had acted in good faith
and without malice. If this be the level of proof which the
Tenth Circuit will require in section 1983 suits, then it has
taken a significant step. If it be not the test, and other language in the decision indicates that the usual preponderance
standard is all that is necessary, the court must act to clarify
this. Clearly, the "clear and convincing" standard is preferable, since if the privilege be invoked, it will bar a person
from a recovery he would otherwise have been entitled to.
CONCLUSION

In Smith, the Tenth Circuit has moved to align itself
with the positions taken by its sister courts. In doing so, it
has shifted from its former position which made recovery
against public officials in section 1983 actions difficult. However, the court has moved neither far nor fast. It has permitted
public officials to be held personally liable in such actions,
but it has also taken pains to provide a protective shield of
immunity for such officials. In subsequent cases, the court
will have to further define all those areas which axe still
vague.
It is suggested that rather than using the complicated and
confusing test which incorporates several imprecise factors,
at least with reference to public boards, the court apply a uni44. The Defense of "Good Faith" Under Section 1983, supra note 31, at 669-670.
45. Supra note 17.
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form test to all defendants, regardless of their relative positions. That standard should be that, absent a showing by
"clear and convincing" evidence by the defendant that he
has acted in good faith, he should be liable for money damages
when he has acted under color of law to deprive a person of
his constitutional and civil rights. Rather than making
persons hesitant to assume public offices or to make decisions
a test of this nature will insure that more thoughtful decisions
will be made and that tendencies to rely on constitutionally
impermissible reasons in making decisions will be diminished.
GEORGE A. ZUNKEB
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